aBstract. Telecommunications reform, one of the pillars of President
Following the 1910 revolution, Mexico's economy was developed by monopolistic interests that operated on the local, regional and national levels. The telecom sector was no exception. 1 Since capital formation and economies of scale were so vital in developing a functional infrastructure, the government deemed competition as against the public interest.
2 Licenses were granted on a discretionary basis pursuant to loyalty both to the government and (most importantly) the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional), the political party that ruled Mexico for over 70 years. 3 Without loyalty, no applicant was able to obtain a broadcasting license.
The Broadcasting Law was enacted in 1960 to regulate free-to-air radio and TV, including digital content. Although this law was amended several times during the 20 th century, the most significant amendment was the socalled Ley Televisa 4 enacted in 2006. In a case filed by a group of senators against it, 5 Mexico's Supreme Court later declared several major parts of this law to be unconstitutional. 6 The 1990s was characterized by privatizations and economic liberalization. The Mexican government privatized the public telecom monopoly (Telmex, 1990), 7 a public TV broadcasting network (Imevisión -Canal 7 and 13, 1993), and the satellite monopoly (Satmex, 1997). 8 The Telecommunications Law enacted in 1995 helped open the telecom sector to competition, including the creation of a regulator (Cofetel, 1996 (Cofetel, -2013 . 9 Increased competition was supposed to improve the quality of services, increase access and lower prices.
Although nearly two decades have passed since the supposed opening of the Mexican telecom market, the sector is still dominated by a few powerful players:
-Fix telephony = América Móvil (Telmex): 67.7%. 4 This amendment was known as Ley Televisa because of evidence that Grupo Televisa played a major role in both drafting the amendment and the legislative process. 5 An action challenging the constitutionality of a law (acción de inconstitucionalidad) may be filed by at least 1/3 of the senators or deputies. Senators from the three major political parties (PRI, Partido Acción Nacional and Partido de la Revolución Democrática) signed the lawsuit against the Ley Televisa. 6 
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-Mobile data and internet = América Móvil (Telcel): 62%.
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-Pay TV = Grupo Televisa: approx. 53.7%.
14 -Free-to-air TV = Grupo Televisa: 70% (2012) 15 average share of transmissions computed from the beginning of the transmission to the end of it. 16 ii. MaJor reforM without deBate One day after Enrique Peña Nieto's inauguration as President of Mexico (2012), the Pact for Mexico between the new administration and all major Mexican political parties was announced. 17 The Pact for Mexico was based on an ambitious policy agenda, including major reforms in both telecommunications and broadcasting.
In The Mexican Constitution recognizes human rights, demarcates national territory, and establishes the Federal system, the government structure and its divisions. The Constitution has been used by legislators as an instrument of public policy under the assumption that if a new right for citizens is included in the Constitution, then it will become a reality. However, such assumption is not supported by Mexican history. For example, the right to education is in the Constitution since the beginning of the 20 th century, nonetheless, many Mexican children are still unable to enjoy their right to education. The same is applicable with the right to health, to a sound environment, to a dwelling, and so forth. Regarding the telecom reform, the same assumption was made in connection with the right to access information and communication technologies, telecom and broadcasting services, internet and broadband.
The telecom amendment was enacted to: (1) recognize a right to access information and communication technologies, broadcast, telecommunications, internet and broadband services; (2) recognize that media audience has rights, mandate Congress to establish them in the law and provide mechanisms to protect them; and (3) curb the dominance of big industry players like America Movil (Telmex and Telcel) and Televisa. In the case of Televisa its power is over public opinion formation and democracy, whereas America Movil's power impacts the economy and telecom service users insofar as they are able to set high prices for the services America Movil provides.
The amendment's mandate is to guarantee economic competition, content plurality and to encourage universal coverage, convergence, quality and, most importantly, user access. It granted the regulator with authority to sanction or even split up companies engaged, and to establish restrictions to avoid that preponderant carriers (preponderantes) abuse of their market power.
The amendment is very broad and includes the following:
- dience rights and content (programming and advertisement) delivered through broadcast stations and telecom networks. -The only legal challenge to a regulation, act or omission of the IFT is through a special judicial review (juicio de amparo indirecto) and injunctions are prohibited.
27
-The creation of an independent public agency to provide broadcasting services in Mexico.
28
-Licenses that may be granted for commercial, private, public or social use. "Social use" includes use by communities and indigenous peoples. -The creation of specialized judges and courts in broadcasting, telecommunications and economic competition matter to provide more certainty in this highly litigated field. -Creation of the figure of preponderant carrier (see section VII below). -Compulsory and free retransmission obligations of free-to-air signals through pay TV (must carry) and programming offer by free-to-air TV carriers of their signals for pay TV operators so that they are able to comply with must carry obligations (must offer). 29 The free of charge retransmission are not applicable for preponderant carriers.
-Increase of foreign ownership to 100% in telecom and 49% in broadcast (provided there is reciprocity in the investor's country of origin for broadcast licenses).
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iv. indePendent reguLator?
Although the IFT was created as a constitutionally autonomous entity (ór-gano constitucional autónomo) 31 the Mexican Department of State (Segob) 32 re- 27 The juicio de amparo indirecto is a type of legal proceeding whereby the constitutionality and legality of acts of authority are challenged. Although not the same as a judicial review of the US legal system, the juicio de amparo could be deemed as equivalent to judicial review. 28 Sistema Público de Radiodifusión del Estado Mexicano. 29 Under must carry obligation, pay TV licensee must retransmit the free-to-air channels that are broadcasted in the same area of service. Must offer obligation is for the broadcaster that must provide the free-to-air channels to the pay TV licensees so that they include such channels in their TV guide. 30 Prior to the constitutional amendment, no foreign investment was allowed in the broadcasting sector; in telecom, there was a cap of 49%. The only exception was cellular services, which had no foreign investment cap. See aLvarez, supra note 1, at 420. 31 This category is the maximum autonomy that the Mexican State grants to any public agency, and implies that the agency is not part of the Executive, neither it is from the Legislative, nor from the Judicial branch. tained certain authority over audiovisual content and radio and television transmissions. The LFTR also recognized the authority of the Ministry of Communications 33 to issue opinions regarding licenses that are granted, revoked, transferred or whose controlling party will change; and to the Ministry of Finance 34 to issue opinions regarding payments to be received by the Mexican Treasury for telecom licenses. Do these faculties granted to executive agencies infringe upon the constitutional autonomy of the IFT?
In effect, the Senate report re-authorized Segob to oversee audiovisual content as it has since 1960, pursuant to the argument that the Constitution does not expressly confer such rights on the IFT. 35 This line of reasoning is debatable for several reasons, as explained below.
The Mexican Constitution expressly grants the IFT the authority to regulate telecom and broadcasting services 36 . Unlike the Ministry of Communications or the Ministry of Finance, Segob is not given any specific faculties neither express nor impliedly. For this reason, there is no basis for Segob's authority regarding audiovisual content; and no evidence exists of the legislature's intent to grant that authority in the 2013 amendment process.
Since the nature of radio and television depends on audiovisual content, any authority granted to the IFT regulator for telecom and broadcasting matters must include electronically transmitted content, as this is within its scope by nature.
Content transmitted via radio and TV involve the right of freedom of expression 37 , as they are intertwined with the right to information. In a democracy, the regulation of radio and TV content should not be given to the same public agency that regulates internal affairs, public safety, national security and intelligence services (as is the case with Segob). Prior to Mexico's democratic transition, it was arguably understandable that Segob regulated these matters. In 1960, Mexico's executive branch did not respect human rights in 33 …the autonomy and faculties of the IFT help guarantee the impartial oversight of content, giving legitimacy to this work and avoiding as much as possible the involvement of other entities in regulating media expression. From a human rights perspective, losing this autonomy and impartiality by transferring these faculties to another agency may produce illegitimate controls and restrictions on freedom of expression, in accordance with international standards of freedom of expression, in effect sending a chilling message regarding free media expression. Mexico's free-to-air TV has long been dominated by two media conglomerates: Televisa and TV Azteca. In free-to-air TV, they directly or indirectly hold 95% of commercial licenses, 90% of audience share, and 99% of advertising revenue. 40 Federal and state governments own and operate certain freeto-air TV channels, and none of them have enacted regulation for assuring 38 ernesto viLLanueva, derecho de La inforMación, 63-65 (Miguel Ángel Porrúa and Cámara de Diputados) (México, 2006) . 39 "…la autonomía y facultades del IFT son garantías para que la supervision de los contenidos se lleve a cabo con plena imparcialidad, dando legitimidad a este trabajo y evitando lo más que se pueda la intervención de otros poderes en el ejercicio de la libertad de expression en medios de comunicación. Perder esta autonomía e imparcialidad al trasladar estas funciones a otro órgano, desde un enfoque de derechos humanos, podría devenir en controles y limitaciones ilegítimas de acuerdo a los estándares internacionales de libertad de expression, en mecanismos de censura o, incluso, en un mensaje amedrentador para la libertad de expression editorial independence (e.g. fix term for the general director, minimum annual budget). There are few social media channels such as community radio or indigenous radio stations. For this reason, broadcast media plurality is a major challenge for true democracy in Mexico. Although internet and broadband access could be deemed as alternative media to access to information, they are still not sufficiently widespread for the population in general to be considered an alternative news media. Under the new amendment, telecom and broadcasting licenses shall be granted for social use, including grants to certain communities (e.g. non-profit organization for women´s rights, San Juan Ixcaquixtla community) and indigenous groups (e.g. mazateco people living in Puebla, yaqui people living in Sonora). This would go a long way toward encouraging plurality in Mexico. 41 This said, the LFTR includes several provisions that negatively (and unjustifiably) discriminate against communities and indigenous people, as evidenced below:
-Any license for commercial or private use of the spectrum may be granted for up to 20 years. For social use, however, the maximum is 15 years. 42 Nothing exists in the legislative record to indicate any intent to differentiate between commercial/private and social/public. -The solicitation and acquisition process for a spectrum license for social use is subject to the IFT's discretion. The article of the law that expressly refers to the information that the applicants must provide to the regulator, is not an exhaustive list as it refers to a minimum of information ("at least provide") and not a maximum. 43 Note that a similar provision was held unconstitutional by the Mexican Supreme Court in a case that also dealt with broadcast spectrum licenses for not-for-profit entities. -Each year, the IFT must publish a spectrum program whereby it provides information of which frequencies will be given in public auction or which ones will be granted for social or public use. Also, IFT must enact compulsory guidelines for applicants. 45 No parameters currently exist to limit the nature of these guidelines. -The IFT retains complete discretion to grant or deny a spectrum license for social use, 46 whereas the grant of commercial and private licenses are far more predictable. The Human Rights Commission of Mexico City, civil organizations and prominent academics have pointed out the unfairness of imposing stricter requirements for social use than for commercial use.
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-Social use licensees are prohibited from receiving advertising income, 48 which runs counter to the Freedom of Expression Standards for Free and Inclusive Broadcasting. 49 The latter expressly states that "legal provisions regulating community broadcasting must recognize the special nature of these media and contain, as a minimum, the following elements: (a) simple procedures for obtaining licenses; (b) no demand of severe technological requirements that would prevent them, in practice, from even being able to file a request for space with the State; and (c) the possibility of using advertising to finance their operations…".
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-The Supreme Court also ruled that the Mexican government had no right to prevent community media (e.g. radio or TV station owned and operated by the people of a local community) from receiving advertising income from public entities. 51 The Human Rights Commission of Mexico City believes that social media restrictions "…limit the possi- 
bility of financial autonomy and independence, as these organizations are prohibited from receiving income from advertisements of public entities…".
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-Under the LFTR, the only exception for a community media station to receive income from advertisement is when this is from public agencies, but such income is restricted to the equivalent of 6% of transmission time for TV and 14% for radio. 53 In addition, public agencies are prohibited from using over 1% of their advertising budget for these types of social use licenses.
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The debate over the prohibition of advertising revenues by social use licensees must be viewed in relation to the National Broadcast Industry Chamber (CIRT). 55 The CIRT has publicly stated on numerous occasions that neither public media nor social media should be allowed to receive advertising income as this would amount to "unfair competition". 56 The "unfair competition" argument is based on the fact that arguably the commercial media do not receive any government subsidies, that advertisement generates income and a not-for-profit organization must not receive such income as that would be equivalent to perceiving earnings. Such unfair competition, however, makes no sense in light of the fact that social media do not compete with commercial media, and receiving income is not the same as having earnings or pursuing a commercial purpose. 58 The problem, however, is that broadcast quality at these frequency allocations are inferior. In effect, this amounts to a per se unjustifiable discrimination against communities and indigenous people. -Social use licenses for indigenous people are defined as those utilized to promote, develop and preserve indigenous languages and culture.
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In this way, the IFT may deny a license if it fails to fulfill this purpose, as well as those intended for political propaganda. In other words an indigenous community has limited rights to obtain a licenses for purposes that other ordinary citizens could apply for. This could amount to a discrimination and a restriction to freedom of expression of indigenous people. Moreover, article 2 of the Mexican Constitution mandates an affirmative action to promote indigenous media, whereas the LFTR establishes restrictions without reason and against the interests of indigenous people.
vi. audience and user rights
Audience rights are related with content (programs and advertisement) delivered by telecom network or broadcast stations, whereas users rights are referred to those rights of a person as a user of telecom services (e.g. telephony, mobile phone, internet access). For the first time in Mexico, the Constitution acknowledges audience and users rights, and mandates that the law must provide mechanisms for protecting them. The Constitution refers also that there must be a balance between programming and advertisement, in other words, that there must be a maximum time allowed for advertisement.
Audience rights. Although the LFTR was enacted in 2014, it was based almost entirely on 20 th century concepts, e.g., audience rights are considered only in relation to broadcasting. 60 No reference is made to other digital media platforms such as mobile TV, IPTV or on-demand internet services (e.g. Netflix). The LFTR requires that all broadcasters maintain a code of ethics, and an ombudsperson established to defend audience rights. Anyone who considers radio or TV content to violate an audience right may file a claim before the channel's ombudsperson, who will review the claim and issue a ruling. 61 The process for defending audience rights gives the appearance of an ordinary self-regulation procedure through an ombudsperson. 62 However, under the LFTR there is no remedy if the licensee fails to comply with the ombudsperson's recommendation; nor is there any sanction for violating audience rights through content broadcast or pay TV transmissions. During the process at the Senate, the ombudspersons of broadcasting stations in Mexico issued a public declaration against the LFTR draft because, in their opinion "…audience rights may become meaningless, as compliance is completely subject to the discretion of both licensee and ombudsperson". 63 Advertising. The Broadcast Act of 1960 (no longer in effect) established that advertising by TV broadcasters could not exceed 18% of the total transmission time; radio broadcasters were limited to 40%. 64 It is important to realize that in 1960, broadcasting stations transmitted for less than 24 hours per day. In 2006 an amendment to the Broadcast Act of 1960 (also known as Ley Televisa) granted broadcasters the right to increase advertising as a percentage of total broadcast time an additional 5% if they dedicate at least 20% of programming to independent national productions. 65 Mexico had the chance to update its legislation in at least two significant ways: (1) ensure compliance with the constitutional mandate to balance advertising and programming; 66 and (2) adapt to the 21st century reality that most stations already transmit 24 hours a day and that the maximum amount of advertising must be computed per hour in order to prevent that advertisements at prime time could be of half the time of the programming, for example. then it may increase advertising as a percentage of total transmission time by an additional 2%. This national production is different from the national independent production, adding both percentages then the maximum time of advertisement may be increased in 7% more. 73 The Mexican President´s bill did not provide any arguments for such increases beside stating that such provision would foster national production.
The Senate reports stated:
In content-related matters, it is important to promote national production pursuant to the Constitution, for which reason this Decree allows commercial broadcasters who choose to use national and/or independent programming during at least 20% of their total programming time may increase the percentage of advertising time. This arrangement incentivizes licensees to use national programming and benefits national independent producers.
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The Chamber of Deputies did not provide any further argument regarding this matter, limiting discussion to wording and basically repeating the Senate's same arguments. Broadcasters in other countries are legally obligated to include a certain percentage of national production but without a quid pro quo of increased advertising, as this would in fact affect the audience which must bear more advertisements and less programming. For example, member states of the European Union encourage TV broadcasters to allocate at least 10% of their transmission time to independent European productions; or invest at least 10% of their budget in independent European productions. 76 In Colombia, TV broadcasters must comply with certain minimum national programming percentages on a quarterly basis that depends on the time of day. For example, Colombian national channels must include at least 70% of national production from 19 to 22.30 hours; between 10 and 19 hours and between 22:30 and 24 hours at least 50% must be national production. On Saturdays, Sundays and holidays at least 50% of the programming must be national production from 19 to 22.30 hours. 77 Moreover, the LFTR defines national production as "content or programs generated by an individual or an entity financed primarily with resources of Mexican origin". 78 This definition essentially permits that audiovisual or audio content may be produced abroad by a non-Mexican entity, with content relevant to another country with no reference to Mexico or its culture, but as long as such content is primarily financed by Mexican resources, then it complies with the LFTR definition and thus broadcasters may increase advertising time.
[L.F.T.R.] [Telecommunications and
In contrast, Colombian legislation defines national production as: (1) programming which has been realized at all stages by Colombian artistic and technical personnel, with the participation of national actors in leading and secondary roles; and (2) foreign actors are allowed as long as they do not exceed 10% of leading roles, and are from nations that give the same or similar rights to Colombian actors. 77 Ley 185 de 1995 por la cual se reglamenta el servicio de televisión y se formulan políticas para su desarrollo, se democratiza el acceso a éste, se conforma la Comisión Nacional de Televisión, se promueven la industria y actividades de televisión, se establecen normas para contratación de los servicios, se reestructuran [sic] entidades del sector y se dictan otras disposiciones en materia de telecomunicaciones [Law 185 of 1995 by which the television service is regulated and policies for its development are enacted, the access to television service is democratized, the National Television Commission is created, the television industry and activity is fostered, the norms to contract these services are established, the sector entities are restructured and the other provisions in telecommunications are enacted], as amended, (Col. 79 Ley 185 de 1995 por la cual se reglamenta el servicio de televisión y se formulan políticas para su desarrollo, se democratiza el acceso a éste, se conforma la Comisión Nacional de Televisión, se promueven la industria y actividades de televisión, se establecen normas para contratación de los servicios, se reestructuran [sic] entidades del sector y se dictan otras User rights. Politicians, legislators and media companies in favor of the LFTR claimed that it included several new rights for telecom users. These same rights, however, already existed in consumer regulation (NOM-184). 80 Additionally, certain rights are better protected in the consumer regulation rather than in the new law. For example, when services are not rendered pursuant to the terms and conditions offered by the operator, consumer regulation entitles consumers to receive both a compensation equivalent to the time where services were not provided as they should, and at least a 20% bonus.
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The LFTR eliminated the minimum 20% bonus, hence the bonus will be unilaterally decided either by the telecommunications operator in its adhesion contract or by the authority and may be less than 20%.
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The consumer regulation cited above states that binding contracts may not include a clause allowing the telecom operator to unilaterally modify the terms and conditions entered into with a consumer, unless such modification implies a reduction of prices or an increase in services offered to the consumer at the same price. 83 The LFTR allows the operator to include a clause that enables the operator to modify the terms and conditions subject to prior notice to the consumer. 84 This LFTR provision fails to enhance telecom consumers' rights. In fact, it does the exact opposite insofar as the new LFTR allows operators to modify conditions without having to acquire prior consent.
vii. PuBLic or Private interests first?
Although the telecom amendment was supposedly enacted to enhance democracy and increase access to culture, education, health and, in general, the disposiciones en materia de telecomunicaciones [Law 185 of 1995 by which the television service is regulated and policies for its development are enacted, access to television service is democratized, the National Television Commission is created, television industry and activity is fostered, norms to contract these services are established, industrty entities are restructured and other telecom provisions are enacted], as amended, (Col. full exercise of human rights, the bill clearly reflects monopolists' battle to prioritize their own private interests over public welfare. Preponderant carrier. The Constitution requires the IFT to determine preponderant carriers telecom and broadcast groups that hold more than 50% of national participation in such services based on the number of users, audience, network traffic or capacity, and impose special obligations in order to limit their market power. The only problem is that the Constitution refers to "sectors" in one paragraph and "services" in another one. For this reason, much LFTR-related debate was devoted to whether national participation should be based on sector (telecom and broadcast) or services (fixed telephony, mobile telephony, pay TV, internet access, radio and free-to-air TV).
Whether this calculation is based on sector or services produces very distinct results. Based on sector, for example, América Móvil (holding company of Telmex and Telcel) would be the preponderant carrier. Televisa, on the other hand, would not be preponderant, as it does not hold a majority share in radio broadcasting. If based on services, however, both América Móvil (fixed and mobile telephony and internet access) and Televisa (free-to-air TV and pay TV) would be deemed preponderant carriers.
The Senate and Deputy Chamber reports proposed an interpretation that preponderant would be by sector rather than by services. The LFTR simply copied the constitutional provision regarding preponderance ad verbatim and described the special obligations that could be imposed to the preponderant in telecom and to the preponderant in broadcast. Apparently one purpose of the telecom reform was to limit big corporate groups powers that affected competition, if so were the case, then the LFTR should have based its calculation on services (not by sector) to limit the market power as described in the paragraph above.
Before the LFTR was enacted, the IFT declared América Móvil as preponderant carrier in the telecom sector based on its number of users, 85 and Grupo Televisa as preponderant carrier in the broadcast sector based on its audience. IFT stated that for determining Grupo Televisa as preponderant it would not consider free-to-air radio as it was a different market. Televisa and its independent affiliates filed judicial reviews (amparos) against the preponderance, arguing inter-alia that free-to-air radio service is part of the broadcast sector and IFT had failed to include in its calculation the freeto-air radio audience. Whether preponderance will ultimately be declared by sector or by service will depend on the criteria that the specialized tribunals adopt.
Cross-ownership. Cross-ownership of telecom and broadcasting licenses may be limited by the IFT pursuant to the Constitution. Such limits do not include any reference to other media (e.g. magazines, newspapers). "Limits to media cross-ownership are an instrument to prevent freedom of expression and the right to information from being affected by an over-concentration of media outlets in one corporate group. Media may be newspapers, magazines, radio and television stations, pay television and may even include the internet".
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The LFTR has a chapter for cross-ownership which over time will prove to be ineffective because the measures enacted do tackle the absence of plurality and limited access to diverse information through broadcast and telecom networks. The LFTR regards cross-ownership as a three-stage process: 1 st stage: If there is limited access to plural information in certain markets and geographic areas, then the IFT may demand that the licensee of pay TV: (1) include certain news or public interest channels; and (2) include at least three channels with productions of mostly independent national programing which are independent from carriers. 88 The main objection to this stage is that in a country like Mexico, most people still primarily watch free-to-air TV. Only a minority of homes in Mexico have access to pay TV. For the sake of plurality, these measures should be applied to TV broadcasters rather than pay TV licensees. 2 nd stage: In the event that a licensee fails to comply with the first stage, then the IFT may impose limits regarding (1) the number of broadcasting spectrum it may hold; (2) new spectrum broadcast licenses; and (3) crossownership of diverse media (broadcast/telecom) by one corporation in the same market and area. Despite these cross-ownership rules, it will be difficult for the IFT to successfully implement each and every stage of this process because (a) the procedures are highly cumbersome; and (b) the legal tools are inadequate to achieve plurality.
Exemption to merger review. All telecom mergers that exceed a fixed amount must be authorized by the IFT. 91 The IFT analyzes whether the merger will have adverse effects on competition, and may grant authorization, rejection or approval depending on compliance with certain conditions. The only exception to this review is set forth in the Antitrust Law of 2014, when the merger is (i) between agents that are not competitors, (ii) such agents are not from related markets, and (iii) it is notorious that there will be no negative impact on competition.
92 Even in these exceptional cases Antitrust Law requires that the authority receives a filing prior to merger so that the authority analyses the case and confirms that the merger is one that notoriously does not affect competition.
During backdoor sessions in the Senate -outside public scrutiny-a provision was worked out to bypass the merger review. This became known as the Cablecom Clause because Televisa had announced in 2013 that it had acquired several debt instruments that could give it control of Cablecom, one of its pay TV competitors. 93 Exemption would be permitted if (a) there is a preponderant; (b) a reduction of certain levels of the dominance index and Any acquirer that would like to be benefitted by the Cablecom Clause must provide notice to the IFT for review after the merger took place. If this review determines that the merger would give the acquirer a dominant position or adversely affect competition, then the IFT must initiate a new investigation to gauge the acquirer's market position and adopt measures to minimize adverse effects to competition. 94 The rationale for approving the Cablecom Clause was arguably to foster competition and develop feasible long run competitors. However, an exception to the Antitrust Law (prior review and approval of a merger) must have had a better reason other than a fast-track merger process with no review in advance by the regulator and no possibility of imposing conditions to the merger. Moreover, article 28 of the Constitution prohibits the concentrations and acts that affect consumer welfare due to lack of effective competition, and Cablecom Clause essentially allows any merger (even between competitors of the same market and the same service) without the analysis of the IFT. This deprives the regulator of its faculties to overview the telecommunications development under a competitive market.
The same day that the LFTR entered into force, Grupo Televisa announced that it had acquired 100% of Cablecom. 95 The provision analyzed in this section prevented the IFT from rejecting such merger, and the IFT did not impose conditions on Televisa-Cablecom from the merger post-review. 96 Note that prior to the existence of the Cablecom Clause, the mergers by Televisa of other pay TV companies in 2006 and 2007 were subject to several conditions that purported to diminish the risk of anticompetitive behavior. 97 On January 2015, Grupo Televisa announced that it had acquired one of its 94 major competitors in pay TV in Mexico, Cablevisión Red. 98 Grupo Televisa has already filed its notice before the IFT, and it most certainly be processed in the same terms as the Cablecom acquisition.
viii. huMan rights concerns
The initial bill presented by president Peña Nieto posed major threats to human rights, as pointed out by the Human Rights Commission of Mexico City. 99 Although several changes were made to minimize these transgressions, several provisions of the LFTR regarding data retention by telecom operators and geolocation could affect human rights of Mexican telecom users as the right to privacy, for example.
Data retention. The LFTR requires telecom carriers to retain certain data from users' communications for a period of 24 months. The data must be: communication type (voice, data, SMS, voice mail, call forwarding); originating and recipient points; and date, hour and length of each communication, among others. 100 These transmissions contain information that are capable of revealing personal data, including political ideology, sexual preference and mental health problems, for example.
It is important to note that the European Court of Justice ruled on April 2014 that data retention by telecom carriers for investigation of grave crimes as set forth in the Data Retention Directive violated human rights because of infringement of the proportionality principle.
ing; and (2) solicitations by Federal and State Attorney Generals or prosecuprosecute grave crimes, nor are they related with national security. Finally, the LFTR does not require prior judicial review, nor can requests be made to file claims against abusive use of this data.
ix. Positive asPects
The LFTR does include certain positive elements, including provisions for ICT accessibility by persons with disabilities in Mexico, and the elimination of long distance charges, as explained below.
ICT accessibility. Although Mexico is part of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, it had never enacted a single law or regulation related to ICT accessibility. President ' s bill of law initially presented to the Mexican Congress had only three lines on ICT accessibility, providing for subtitles in news programs for multiprogramming channels in digital TV.
109
During the legislative process an initiative was introduced by disability rights activists demanding that Congress address ICT accessibility on the basis of human rights. 110 This initiative was supported by several senators from different political parties, the Human Rights Commission of Mexico City, and diverse media. The LFTR included two chapters and several provisions in relation to ICT accessibility that serve as a starting point.
The -Pulbic agency web sites must comply with accessibility criteria and be updated as technology evolves. -Subtitles and sign language must be included in a minimum of one news program with national coverage. -Closed captions must be featured in all programs scheduled between 6 am and midnight by commercial free-to-air TV channels with coverage exceeding 50% of national territory. Federal agency channels must also include closed captions.
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-Telecom carriers and mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) must offer accessible formats for persons with disabilities. -Broadcasters must provide accessible means for individuals with disabilities to file complaints about programming violations before the ombudsperson. -The programming guides must be in accessible formats through a telephone number or a website.
Free long distance calls. The LFTR prevents telecom carriers from charging for long distance calls within national territory starting from January 1, 2015.
113 This provision was designed to benefit low-income users, provided that the telecom service packages of telecom operators that included free long distance calls for a given price, were unaffordable for an average citizen.
x. finaL reMarKs
Media convergence in the digital era has erased all distinctions between broadcasting and other forms of telecommunications. For this reason, the nation needs a single legal framework for all electronic networks with the following characteristics: (a) competition in telecommunications is as important as plurality; (b) protection of the public interest instead of giving privileges to private interests; (c) a direct relationship between the legal rationale for provisions and public interest objectives; (d) coherent laws; and (e) content through different technological platforms should be governed by another law. Telecommunication services are more than just technology; they are essential for full enjoyment of several human rights. Although the reform had the potential to increase democracy and enhance living standards, the real public interest (e.g., user and audience rights) never played a key role. Instead, the debate revolved around balancing benefits and costs between the same media oligarchs. The absence of real debate and discussion in both the Senate and Chamber of Deputies reflects how far Mexico must still travel to attain real democracy.
In light of these inadequacies, perhaps we must rely on digital technology to curtail Mexican media oligopolies and inject real competition into the telecom sector. The IFT mandate -namely, to guarantee economic competition and content plurality, and to encourage universal coverage, convergence, quality and access-has yet to be fulfilled.
